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URING the Survey period numerous cases were decided in the area
of real property. The courts addressed disputes concerning the use
of land, restrictive covenants and easements, and specific perform-
ance. Actions involving real estate brokers occupied the appellate courts as
well. Significant legislative changes also took place during the survey period.
I. CONTRACTS FOR THE SALE OF LAND
A. Specific Performance
Five cases during the Survey period addressed questions of specific per-
formance in real estate contracts. In Lubel v. J.H. Uptmore & Associates, the
buyer brought suit for reformation and specific performance of a contract to
sell land after the seller refused performance claiming insufficiency of the
property description. A map attached to the earnest money contract with
the disputed property outlined in red constituted the only admissible de-
scription of the property. The trial court found the description insufficient
under the Statute of Frauds2 and entered a directed verdict for the seller. 3
While not disputing the insufficiency of the map, the buyer argued on ap-
peal that the two part exception to the general rule of the Statute of Frauds
set forth in Morrow v. Shotwell 4 applied to the case. The exception allows
reformation and specific performance of a contract for the sale of real estate
(1) if strong evidence exists that both parties intended the inclusion of a
description of a specific tract in the sales contract, and (2) if both parties to
the contract were mutually mistaken in the belief that the included property
description met all legal requirements. 5 The court, however, held that no
strong evidence existed to indicate that the seller intended to convey a spe-
cific tract of land. 6 The buyer and seller had no prior business relationship
* B.S.F.S., Georgetown University; J.D., Duke University; LL.M., Columbia Univer-
sity. Attorney at Law, Stutzman & Bromberg, Dallas, Texas.
1. 680 S.W.2d 518, 518 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1984, no writ).
2. TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 26.01 (Vernon 1968) (requiring a writing and signa-
ture for real estate sales contracts).
3. 680 S.W.2d at 519.
4. 477 S.W.2d 538, 541 (Tex. 1972).
5. 680 S.W.2d at 520; Morrow, 477 S.W.2d at 541.
6. 680 S.W.2d at 520.
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regarding a specific tract that would indicate that both parties knew to
which tract the contract pertained. 7 Furthermore, the buyer never took pos-
session of any specific tract. The map attached to the earnest money con-
tract described the property only in vague terms and gave no indication that
the parties believed that it met all legal requirements. In summary, the court
found that Morrow v. Shotwell simply did not apply to the facts of this case.8
The court stated that "the rule of Morrow v. Shotwell will apply only where
there is a misdescription, not a failure of identification." 9
Garner v. Redeaux'0 presented an unusual set of facts. Redeaux originally
sued for specific performance on a written contract for the sale of land. The
only writing evidencing the sale was a statement on the back of the
Readeaux check. That writing failed to set forth terms of payment or fully
to describe the property. 1' The court expressed further concern that the
writing failed to specify clearly whether the conveyance was in fee or was
merely a lease.12 The court of appeals held that the writing satisfied the Stat-
ute of Frauds, 13 theorizing that the wife's signature and husband's later ac-
ceptance of payment ratified the writing. 14 The court found that the absence
of the terms of payment did not invalidate the sufficiency of the writing.15
The court also inferred that the language of the writing more clearly ex-
pressed a promise to convey land rather than to lease it.16
Finally, the absence of an adequate property description failed to deter the
court from upholding specific performance. 17 Though the trial court took
judicial notice that Highland Home Addition, the property tract in question,
is in Harris County, Texas, the court of appeals rejected the use of judicial
notice in the context of interpreting the property description because the
location of the disputed tract was not a matter of common knowledge in the
community.' 8 Despite its rejection of judicial notice, the court took an ex-
tremely liberal view and allowed extrinsic evidence to establish that the
property description in the writing applied to a specific tract of land in Har-
ris County, Texas.19 The sellers also argued that the agreement could not be
enforced by specific performance because the writing failed to include all of
7. Id.
8. Id.
9. 680 S.W.2d at 520.
10. 678 S.W.2d 124, 124 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1984, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
11. See supra note 2 for writing requirements of the Statute of Frauds.
12. The writing on the Redeaux's check appeared as follows: -9-6-78, From Mr. & Mrs.
Garner, Lot tract land, tract 66-Block 3, Highland Home Addition, pd this account two thou-
sand dollars & Bal Four Thousand in payment." Id. at 126. Evalyn Garner, wife of appellant,
signed the writing. Id. at 125-26.
13. See supra, note 2 (statute requires a writing and signature for real estate contracts).
14. 678 S.W.2d at 126.
15. Id., citing Botello v. Miesener-Collins Co., 469 S.W.2d 793, 794 (Tex. 1971) (a writing
does not require a statement of terms of payment or consideration to satisfy the Statute of
Frauds).
16. 678 S.W.2d at 126.
17. Id. at 128.
18. Id. at 127, citing Osborne v. Moore, 112 Tex. 361, 247 S.W. 498, 499 (1923); see
Harper v. Killion, 345 S.W.2d 309, 311 (Tex. Civ. App.-Texarkana 1961, no writ).
19. 678 S.W.2d at 127.
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the essential terms. The court found that contention unpersuasive and
stated that specific performance is an appropriate remedy if the agreement
appears complete, though the writing may not.20 An agreement established
through writing and supplemented by testimony is all that is necessary for
specific performance. 21 In support of its conclusion the court applied the
"mere skeleton" exception to the parole evidence rule, which applies if the
document, though not complete, is a mere skeleton of a more complete
agreement of the parties. 22
The Statutes of Frauds prevented an oral modification of a contract to
convey land in King v. Texacally Joint Venture.23 King sued the Texacally
Joint Venture for specific performance of a contract to purchase raw land
executed on June 20, 1983. The contract required King to deposit an irrevo-
cable letter of credit in the amount of $50,000.00 "forthwith." King depos-
ited instead a cashier's check on June 28, after the seller orally named June
27 as the absolute deadline. The trial court denied specific performance,
finding that the parties orally modified the contract when they made June 27
the absolute deadline, and King had therefore breached the contract. 24
King argued in the higher court that because the oral agreement materi-
ally modified the written agreement, it was not enforceable under the Statute
of Frauds. 25 The court of appeals held that the oral agreement constituted a
material modification of the contract, making the contract unenforceable
under the Statute of Frauds. 26 The court also held that King fully per-
formed her obligations under the written contract by depositing a cashier's
check eight days after the execution of the contract. 27 The court found that
"forthwith" indicated performance within a reasonable time, not
immediately. 28
Builders Sand Inc. v. Turtur29 also involved timeliness in the context of a
contract to convey. The purchaser sued for specific performance although
he earlier had informed the seller that he could not close on the date men-
tioned in the contract. The court denied the purchaser's claim for specific
performance holding that the purchaser's actions amounted to an anticipa-
tory repudiation, relieving the seller of all obligations under the contract. 30
Moreover, the contract called for payment in cash and the purchaser ten-
dered checks, which may or may not have been drawn on sufficient funds.
20. Id. at 127, 128; see Miller v. Hodges, 260 S.W. 168, 170 (Tex. Comm'n App. 1924,
judgmt adopted) (location and description of land ascertainable by methods other than de-
tailed writing).
21. 678 S.W.2d at 128.
22. Id. at 128; see 2 C. MCCORMICK & R. RAY, TEXAS LAW OF EVIDENCE § 1611 (2d
ed. 1956).
23. 690 S.W.2d 618, 620 (Tex. App.-Austin 1985, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
24. Id. at 619.
25. Id.; see also supra note 2 (requirements of Statute of Frauds).
26. 690 S.W.2d at 620.
27. Id.
28. Id.; see Billingsley v. Mossier Acceptance Co., 119 S.W.2d 196, 199 (Tex. Civ. App.-
El Paso 1938, no writ).
29. 678 S.W.2d 115, 117-18 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1984, no writ).
30. Id. at 120.
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The court held that a check is not sufficient when the contract specifically
called for cash.31 Hence, the court found that the purchaser was not ready,
willing and able to perform. 32
A case from the Dallas court of appeals also addressed the question of
whether a party is ready, willing and able to perform. In Various Opportuni-
ties, Inc. v. Sullivan Investments, Inc.33' the seller, Various Opportunities,
Inc., contracted with the purchaser, Sullivan Investments, Inc., for the sale
of 32 acres at $10,000 per acre. The parties twice extended the contract with
the purchaser paying extension fees. When the seller refused performance,
the purchaser brought suit for specific performance. The seller contended
that the terms of the contract were indefinite and, hence, unenforceable. The
questionable terms involved covenants by the seller to "pay the costs and
expenses necessary to provide for 236 dwelling units, water and sanitary
sewer services acceptable to and approved by the City of Grand Prai-
rie. . . .,34 The court ordered specific performance of the contract even
though some terms were to be fixed in the future.35 The court ruled that the
terms were sufficiently definite.36
B. Usury
Two cases from the courts of appeals dealt with issues of usury in real
estate transactions. In Bray v. McNeely37 Bray decided to invest with Mc-
Neely who was in the real estate business. In August, 1978, Bray entered
into an arrangement with McNeely that involved a 6.5 acre tract in
Pasadena, Texas. The agreement called for Bray to buy a one-half interest
for $50,000 with an option to require McNeely to purchase Bray's one-half
interest in the property at a price of $55,000 if McNeely could not sell the
property by October 15, 1978. McNeely failed to sell the property by the
specified date, and Bray, exercising his option, demanded payment of the
$55,000, which McNeely refused. In the trial court the jury returned issues
finding that the transaction involved an investment rather than a loan, and a
purchase by McNeely of Bray's investment at a profit to Bray. 38 The trial
31. Id. at 121; see also Moore v. Copeland, 478 S.W.2d 573, 577 (Tex. Civ. App.-Corpus
Christi 1972, writ refd n.r.e.) (check is insufficient payment unless payee consents).
32. Turtur, 678 S.W.2d at 121.
33. 677 S.W.2d 115, 116-17 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1984, no writ).
34. Id.
35. Id. at 117.
36. The contract of sale sufficiently identifies the seller, the purchaser, the prop-
erty, the escrow agent and duties thereof, and the purchase price per acre. The
contract and amendments, which are definitely incorporated into the judgment,
provide a specific means for resolving any future disputes as to the cost of in-
stalling the utilities. This is in the nature of third party arbitration which left
nothing discretionary to be accomplished or determined by either the seller or
purchaser. It has been held that in the event terms of future performance are
definitely set forth and not left to future negotiation between the parties, specific
performance of the contract can be accomplished.
Id. at 117-118; see Pacific Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Westglen Park, Inc., 314 S.W.2d 425, 428 (Tex.
Civ. App.-Texarkana 1958), rev'd on other grounds, 160 Tex. 1, 325 S.W.2d 113, 117 (1959).
37. 682 S.W.2d 615, 616 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1984, no writ).
38. Id. at 617.
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court, nonetheless, granted a judgment non obstante veredicto,39 finding as a
matter of law that the transaction involved a usurious loan.4°
On appeal the court addressed the elements necessary for usury to exist.
Those elements include: "(1) a loan of money; (2) an absolute obligation
that the principal be repaid, and (3) the exaction of a greater compensation
than allowed by law for the use of money by the borrower."'4' Contingent
payments, the court observed, are not necessarily usurious. 42 Here, no abso-
lute obligation to repay existed, and accordingly one of the necessary ele-
ments of a loan transaction failed.43 The documents indicated that the
parties intended a sale of property, not a loan. McNeely had no absolute
obligation to pay Bray $55,000 or any other amount. Unless McNeely failed
to sell the land and Bray exercised his option, McNeely owed nothing to
Bray. Thus, payment contingent on the sale of land or the exercise of an
option does not constitute a usurious loan.44
Tygrett v. University Gardens Homeowners' Association45 involved the le-
gality of a five-dollar per day late fee charged by a condominium homeown-
ers association. The condominium owner's normal monthly assessment was
$228.48. Tygrett, the owner and appellant, fell approximately seventy-nine
days behind in his payments. He eventually paid the principal amount of the
assessments, but disputed the late charges. The homeowners association
sued Tygrett to collect the late fee. Tygrett counterclaimed, contending that
the late charges constituted a usurious rate of interest, 46 and requested ap-
propriate statutory damages.47
The court addressed whether or not the late charges were in fact interest
charges. The court defined interest as a charge for the "use or forbearance
or detention" of money.48 For the above definition to apply, however, a
lending relationship must have existed between Tygrett and the Homeown-
ers Association. 49 Both the trial and appellate courts found no lending rela-
tionship and thus no interest charge.5 0
Tygrett relied upon Dixon v. Brooks,5' which held that the definition of
interest does include late charges.52 The court of appeals, nonetheless, held
39. Id. at 616.
40. Id.
41. Id. (quoting Holley v. Watts, 629 S.W.2d 694, 696 (Tex. 1982); see also Stedman v.
Georgetown Savings & Loan Ass'n, 595 S.W.2d 486, 489 (Tex. 1979) (to apply usury laws the
lender must overcharge for the use, detention, or forebearance of the lender's money).
42. 682 S.W.2d at 619.
43. Id.
44. Id.
45. 687 S.W.2d 481, 482 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1985, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
46. Id.
47. TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 5069-1.06 (Vernon Pam. Supp. 1986) provides that a
party found to have charged usurious rates is liable for three times the amount of interest the
parties originally agreed to.
48. 687 S.W.2d at 483; see Stedman v. Georgetown Savings & Loan Ass'n, 595 S.W.2d
486, 489 (Tex. 1979).
49. 687 S.W.2d at 483.
50. Id.




that the Dixon court had decided that case in the context of a promissory
note and an established lending relationship, whereas in many cases, such as
Tygrett, no usury exists if the late charges are assessed outside of a lending
relationship. 53
II. REAL ESTATE AGENTS AND BROKERS
A. Liability of Agents and Brokers
In Wilson v. Donze54 the Fort Worth court of appeals reaffirmed that a
broker is obliged to act in the best interest of the party for whom the prop-
erty is sold. 55 In Donze, Wilson, a broker, solicited the Donzes, the sellers,
for the sale of their property. When the Donzes told Wilson that they did
not use brokers, Wilson told them that he could obtain his fee from the
buyer if he sold the property and that he knew some people who might be
interested. The Donzes agreed and told Wilson they wanted $85,000 for the
property. Wilson drew up a contract with Ken-Car Investment, Inc. as
buyer. In fact, Wilson and his wife owned Ken-Car. Another broker, Pow-
ers, paid the $1,000 escrow called for in the Donze/Ken-Car contract. Pow-
ers knew that a couple named Bullard was looking for a similar property.
He told the Bullards that the Donzes wanted $10,000 an acre. The Bullards
offered $100,000 for the property. Later, Powers told the Bullards that the
Donzes rejected the $100,000 offer and wanted $115,000. The Bullards then
authorized Powers to make an offer for $115,000. They then received a con-
tract for the sale of the property with Wilson, trustee, as seller. Sometime
later, the Donzes called Wilson and advised him they wanted no less than
$10,000 an acre, but at that point the contract had already been signed. Sub-
sequent to closing, the Bullards received a corrective deed retaining minerals
in the names of Wilson and Powers. Mrs. Bullard called Mrs. Donze and
Mrs. Donze found out for the first time that the Bullards had paid $115,000
for the property, though she received only $85,000. The Donzes sued and
the trial court awarded judgment against Wilson finding $24,900 actual and
$35,000 exemplary damages. 56 On appeal, the court held that Wilson, acting
as broker for the Donzes, had a fiduciary duty to obtain the best possible
price for them.57 Moreover, Wilson's failure to disclose that he purchased
the land for his own anticipated profit constituted a willful and malicious
53. 687 S.W.2d at 484; see Schepps Grocery Co. v. Burroughs Corp., 635 S.W.2d 606, 610
(Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1982, no writ) (lending relationship does not exist in context
of lease relationship); Apparel Mfg. Co. v. Vantage Properties, Inc., 597 S.W.2d 447, 448-49
(Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1980, writ refd n.r.e.); Rimco Enter., Inc. v. Texas Elec. Serv. Co.,
599 S.W.2d 362, 366 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth 1980, writ ref'd n.r.e.) (late charge for
utility billings not considered interest); Southwest Park Outpatient Surgery, Ltd. v. Chandler
Leasing Div., 572 S.W.2d 53, 55-56 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1978, no writ); Ma-
loney v. Andres, 483 S.W.2d 703, 705 (Tex. Civ. App.-Eastland 1972, writ rerd n.r.e.).
54. 692 S.W.2d 734, 736 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 1985, no writ).
55. Id.; see Riley v. Powell, 665 S.W.2d 578, 580 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 1984, writ ref'd
n.r.e.); Burleson v. Earnest, 153 S.W.2d 869, 874 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1941, writ ref d
w.o.r .).
56. 692 S.W.2d at 786.
57. Id. at 739.
[Vol. 40
REAL PROPERTY. PURCHASE, SALE
breach of that fiduciary duty. 58 Due to the willful and malicious nature of
the breach the court upheld the award of exemplary damages.5 9 Even in the
absence of an agreement to pay a commission, Wilson had a fiduciary duty
and that duty required him to obtain the best possible price for the seller
even if the seller has set a lower price. 60
The court also held that a fiduciary duty existed regardless of the fact that
no commission agreement existed between Wilson, the broker, and his prin-
cipal, the Donzes.6 1 A commission agreement is not a pre-requisite for an
owner/broker relationship. 62 Wilson's agreement with the Donzes that he
could collect his commission from the buyer if the Donzes allowed him to
list their property satisfactorily created the owner/broker relationship, and
required that Wilson disclose that he planned to make a profit. 6 3
B. Action for Brokerage Commissions
The court of appeals in Brice v. Eastin64 strictly applied the Statute of
Frauds provision of the Real Estate License Act 65 to real estate commis-
sions.6 6 Eastin informed Brice, the broker, that Eastin had a ranch for sale.
Brice testified that Eastin agreed to a five percent commission over the tele-
phone. Eastin denied any such agreement. In direct negotiations with the
buyer, Eastin reduced the five percent figure that Brice proposed and in-
cluded in the contract two and one-half percent, the other two and one-half
percent going to Eastin's lawyer. Eastin paid the two and one-half percent
commission, and Brice sued for the other two and one-half. The trial court
ordered a directed verdict against Brice on the basis of the Statute of Frauds,
holding that part performance does not bring a contract for a brokerage
commission outside the Statute of Frauds.67 The court of appeals affirmed 68
stating that the doctrine of partial performance applies only to general real
estate contracts. 69 A writing is required of all agreements to pay real estate
commissions or the court will not enforce the agreement. 70 No writing in
support of the five percent agreement existed. Therefore, the court could not
enforce it.
58. Id. at 739-40.
59. Id.
60. Id. at 739.
61. Id.
62. Id.; see Anderson v. Griffith, 501 S.W.2d 695 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth 1973, writ
refd n.r.e.).
63. Id. at 739, citing Riley v. Powell, 665 S.W.2d 578, 580 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 1984,
writ refd n.r.e.) (buyer must obtain best price available for seller).
64. 691 S.W.2d 54, 54 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1985, no writ).
65. TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 6573a (Vernon Supp. 1986).
66. Section 20(b) of the Real Estate License Act prohibits actions for real estate commis-
sions unless the commission agreement is in writing and is signed by the person to be charged.
Id. art. 6573a, § 20(b).
67. 691 S.W.2d at 56.





In Jauregui v. Jones,7' another court of appeals held that by failing to
object at trial a party may waive the requirement that only a licensed broker
may recover in an action for a brokerage commission.72 In Jauregui a bro-
ker entered into an exclusive listing agreement with the owner of a bakery
for the sale of the bakery property. Robert D. Jones, assignee of the listing
agreement wrote on the face of the agreement, "sales commission to be paid
by buyer."'73 Jones contended that he procured a purchaser, that the pur-
chaser bought the property and took possession, but subsequently returned
the property to the seller because of an inability to obtain Small Business
Administration financing. Jones sued for his commission but failed to allege
in his petition that he was a licensed broker.74 The defendant failed to object
to that fact at trial, and the lower court ruled that the defendant waived the
objection. The court of appeals agreed and concurred with the trial court's
opinion that the contract contained ambiguous terms since it contained a
printed-form "seller shall pay" provision with a handwritten "buyer shall
pay" over-printing. 75 The jury found that the parties intended that the
bakery owner pay. The court found ample evidence to support the jury find-
ing and affirmed.76
Arthur P. Gale Realtors v. Belisle77 also involved licensing defenses and
the Statute of Frauds. Gale Realtors was a partnership composed of Arthur
Gale and his mother. Each partner held a broker's license, but the partner-
ship itself held none. The seller, Belisle, called Arthur Gale for assistance in
selling a condominium. The parties did not enter into a written agreement.
The condominium manager referred a possible purchaser, Buckingham, to
the Belisles who in turn referred her to Gale. Gale secured a written con-
tract for the purchase of the condominium for $66,500.00 and a six percent
brokerage fee. The Belisles changed the amount to $67,100.00 and signed
the contract. Mr. Belisle then returned the contract to Buckingham who
wanted to think the terms over. The Belisles later told Gale Realtors that
they were not going to sell, and the realtors dropped the matter. Only
twenty-four days later, the Belisles sold the property to Buckingham for
$66,500.00. Gale Realtors sued to recover commissions on the sale amount-
ing to six percent of the purchase price. The court of appeals reversed a
summary judgment for the seller.78 The court held that a partnership may
recover for brokerage services under the Real Estate License Act even
though the Act contains no provision regarding qualifications for a broker-
71. 695 S.W.2d 258, 258 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1985, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
72. Section 20(a) of the Real Estate License Act prohibits a person from bringing suit for
compensation owed in conjunction with that person acting as a real estate agent; see TEX.
REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 6573a, §§ 2, 4 (Vernon Supp. 1986), if that person did not have a
valid real estate broker's or salesman's license at the time the acts were performed. Id. § 20(a).
TEX. R. Civ. P. 90 provides that unless specifically objected to at trial, all defects or omissions
are waived.
73. 695 S.W.2d at 260.
74. See TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 6573a, § 20(a) (Vernon Supp. 1986).
75. 695 S.W.2d at 262.
76. Id. at 264.
77. 694 S.W.2d 195, 196 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1985, no writ).
78. Id. at 198.
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age license for a partnership. 79 If the person actually rendering the broker-
age services is a licensed broker the partnership may maintain an action for
commissions.80 As a last point, the court found that the language in the
proposed written contract of sale, which the seller actually signed, was suffi-
cient to charge the seller with the promise to pay six percent brokerage fee.81
Accordingly, the requirements of Section 20(b)82 were satisfied.
The broker also prevailed in Morgan v. Letellier83 in which a buyer and a
seller entered into a contract for the sale of thirty acres of land. The con-
tract entitled the broker to a six percent real estate commission. Further-
more, both parties agreed to pay one-half of the commission upon final
consumation. After closing, conducted without the broker's knowledge, the
broker learned that the buyer planned to pay the commission with a promis-
sory note rather than in the manner prescribed in the contract. The broker
sued and recovered. 84 Unless the broker consents, a modification of the con-
tract with respect to the broker's rights to commission is invalid. 85 This is
true even if the modification only postpones the closing date or changes pay-
ment terms or the amount of consideration. 86
In Webb v. Eledge87 the broker was less fortunate. In Webb a landowner
entered into an exclusive listing agreement with a broker agreeing to pay a
brokerage fee of six percent of the sales price when the broker sold, con-
tracted to sell, or exchanged the property or any portion of it. During the
term of the brokerage listing agreement the owner entered into a build-to-
suit lease for a total rental of $270,000. The broker claimed he had pro-
duced the lease and was entitled to his commission. The owner claimed that
the legal description of the listed property was insufficient, thus voiding the
contract.
On appeal, the court held for the owner and found that the Texas Real
Estate License Act 88 prevented recovery absent a proper property descrip-
tion. Furthermore, the buyer and seller's intention or knowledge with re-
79. TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 6573a, § l(b) (Vernon Supp. 1986) makes it unlaw-
ful for a "person" to in any way act as a real estate agent or salesman without a license.
Section 2 of the Act defines person to include a partnership. Id. at § 2(5). Section 6 of the
Act, however, which states qualifications needed for licenses under the Act contains no provi-
sion pertaining to partnerships. Licensing requirements in both corporations and individuals
are provided. Id. at § 6. The lack of qualification guidelines seemed to persuade the court that
in some instances an unlicensed partnership could maintain an action for commissions earned
on a real estate transaction. Gale Realtors, 694 S.W.2d at 198.
80. 694 S.W.2d at 198.
81. Id.
82. TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 6573a, § 20(b) (Vernon Supp. 1986) requires that
some writing must exist of the commission's agreement before a court will enforce an agree-
ment to pay commissions.
83. 677 S.W.2d 165, 166 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1984, no writ).
84. Id.
85. Id. at 167; see also Pierce v. Pois, 15 S.W.2d 1072, 1073-74 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo
1929, no writ).
86. 677 S.W.2d at 167.
87. 678 S.W.2d 259, 259 (Tex. App.-Amarillo 1984, no writ).
88. Id. at 262; TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 6573(a), § 20(b) (Vernon Supp. 1986).
See supra notes 66, 82 for provisions of § 20(b) of the Real Estate License Act.
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spect to a certain tract of property does not validate an otherwise ambiguous
property description, stated the court.89 Because the owner owned other
property in the vicinity of the disputed tract, the court feared that substanti-
ating the property description would subvert the purpose of the Act.90
In Marlin v. Kelly9' the decedent named a real estate broker in his will.
The will provided that the broker possessed the right to collect a commission
from the sale of any property that passed to the decedent's wife. 92 The court
treated the broker as a conditional beneficiary of the decedent's will and
stated that his interest in the estate was a charge upon the property the dece-
dent devised to his wife, 9 3 not affecting the wife's ability to encumber or
dispose of the property.94
A federal court applying Texas law reversed a judgment against the bro-
ker in another action for a real estate commission.95 In Hoyt R. Matise Co.
v. Zurn96 a deal fell apart prior to closing. The broker sued the seller, Zurn,
for commissions based on a contract of sale signed by Zurn and the broker
on behalf of the purchaser. The broker, however, failed to establish that the
buyer authorized her to sign the contract for him, and the district court
denied recovery of the commission. The court of appeals found that point
unpersuasive. The subsequent course of dealing convinced the court that the
buyer authorized the broker to sign the contract. 97 The court also consid-
ered whether the purchaser ever accepted the contract insofar as the seller
had made numerous counteroffers. 98 The court found that a valid contract
existed. The court also allowed the broker to obtain a commission even
though the parties never closed the sale.99 A broker earns his commission
once he procures a purchaser ready, willing and able to buy, regardless of
whether the sale ever closes. 1° ° The broker has no right to a commission
only if the sale does not close and the contract specifically states that the
broker's commission is contingent upon closing, or if the broker is responsi-
ble for the sale not closing.' 0 ' In Zurn the court found an enforceable con-
tract, and found that the broker was entitled to recover a commission. 10 2
89. 678 S.W.2d at 263; see Morrow v. Shotwell, 477 S.W.2d 538, 540 (Tex. 1972); see also
Matney v. Odom, 147 Tex. 26, 210 S.W.2d 980, 984 (1948) (listing agreement not validated by
parties' acknowledgement of description of property).
90. 678 S.W.2d at 262-63.
91. 678 S.W.2d 582, 585 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1984, writ granted).
92. The will read as follows: "Bill Marlin is to be the exclusive real estate agent (6%
commission) for the sale by my wife of any of the r/e passing to her hereunder and shall have a
right against the sales proceeds to her to collect that commission." Id. at 586.
93. Id. at 587.
94. Id.
95. Hoyt R. Matise Co. v. Zurn, 754 F.2d 560, 562 (5th Cir. 1985).
96. Id.
97. Id. at 564-65.
98. Id. at 565-66.
99. Id. at 566-67.
100. Id. at 566, citing Leonard Duckworth, Inc. v. Michael L. Field & Co., 516 F.2d 952,
958 (5th Cir. 1975).
101. 754 F.2d at 566, citing Henry v. Schweitzer, 435 S.W.2d 941, 943-44 (Tex. Civ.
App.-San Antonio 1968, writ refd n.r.e.).
102. 754 F.2d at 567.
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III. WARRANTY AND DECEPTIVE TRADE PRACTICES ACT
In First Texas Savings Association v. Stiff Properties, 10 3 the court found the
defendant lender liable under the Texas Deceptive Trade Practices Act' °4
(DTPA) for failing to provide financing instruments in time for a closing. 10 5
The plaintiff partnership was formed for the purpose of purchasing a beach-
front condominium. It entered into an earnest money contract calling for a
July 1, 1982 closing. The partnership paid the lender, First Texas Savings
Association, an application charge of $160.00. The savings association
through a variety of circumstances failed to have the necessary financing
papers available to the purchasers in time for closing, and the partnership
lost the opportunity to purchase the condominium. The partnership sued
under the DTPA, and the savings association defended on grounds that the
partnership did not meet the Act's definition of a consumer. 10 6 The court,
however, relied on a case decided while First Texas was pending in which the
Texas Supreme Court held that a borrower is a consumer under the DTPA if
his main objective is to lease or purchase goods or services. 017 Since the
borrower's main objective was the purchase of condominiums the transac-
tion fell under the DTPA. Thus, the court held that the savings association
committed an unconscionable act when it failed to prepare the financing pa-
pers on time. 10 8
In Jim Walter Homes, Inc. v. Gonzalez'0 9 the measure of damages occu-
pied most of the court's opinion. The court held that the appropriate mea-
sure of damages in a suit against a homebuilder for a damaged structure
equals the cost of repairs if repairs are feasible and do not involve economic
waste.I 10 Damages in cases in which repairs are not feasible amount to the
difference in the value of the structure if built without defects and the value
of the structure with the defects."I I The distinction is one between substan-
tial compliance and insubstantial compliance. 12 The remedial measure of
damages is applicable only when the contractor is in substantial compliance
with the contract. ' ' 3 The diminution in value measure of damages requested
by the contractor only applies if he has not substantially complied with the
contract. 1 "4
In Barclay v. Johnson '15 a court of appeals found individual officer liabil-
ity because an officer of the corporate homebuilder knowingly participated in
103. 685 S.W.2d 703, 703 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1984, no writ).
104. TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 17.50 (Vernon Pam. Supp. 1986) [hereinafter re-
ferred to as DTPA.
105. 685 S.W.2d 705-706.
106. Id.; see TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 17.45(4) (Vernon Pam. Supp. 1986).
107. La Sara Grain Co. v. First Nat'l Bank, 673 S.W.2d 558, 567 (Tex. 1984).
108. First Texas, 685 S.W.2d at 706.




113. Id.; see Turner, Collie & Bradon, Inc. v. Brookhollow, Inc., 642 S.W.2d 160, 164
(Tex. 1982).
114. 686 S.W.2d at 717; Turner, 642 S.W.2d at 164.
115. 686 S.W.2d 334, 334 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1985, no writ).
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misrepresentations concerning the status of his company. The court held
that a corporate officer risks individual liability if he knowingly participates
in a fraudulent or tortious act, even though the act is performed for the
benefit of the corporation. 116 The officer in Barclay had represented that the
corporation was a bonded and registered builder as well as a member of the
Greater Houston Builder's Association, though none of those representa-
tions was true.
De Los Santos v. Alamo Lumber Co. 117 involved a suit brought by a home-
owner against a homebuilder claiming the builder breached both expressed
and implied warranties. The buyer's expert had testified that the foundation
had settled due to the failure of the builder to properly compact the fill dirt
that half of the house sat upon.' 18 The jury found for the homeowners, but
the court entered a judgment notwithstanding the verdict.' 19 The trial court
found little evidence to support the homeowner's claims that Alamo Lumber
Co. breached the implied warranty to construct the house in a good and
workmanlike manner. 120
IV. TITLE AND CONVEYANCE
A. Deeds and Title Generally
Southern Resources Corp. v. Kincaid,12 1 involved an allegation that a
scrivener erroneously recorded a land deed. The heirs and assignees of W.H.
Williams sued the assignees and the heirs of W.L. Williams in an action to
remove a cloud upon W.H. Williams heirs' and assignees' title. After re-
viewing the evidence, the court found no evidence whatsoever that the scriv-
ener made an error, and found that the trial court should have granted an
instructed verdict in favor of the heirs and assignees of the grantee of
record. 122
Henderson v. Henderson also involved an alleged scrivener's error. 123
John C. Henderson sued his brother, Robert Henderson, seeking to have the
court declare an error in a deed to land. John C. claimed that, through an
error in transcription, the deed named John G. Henderson, the father of the
plaintiff, as grantee, rather than John C. Henderson. The plaintiff argued
that his father transferred the land to him as a gift. Alternatively, the plain-
tiff argued that the running of the statute of limitations entitled him to a
declaration of title. The plaintiff's brother, Robert C. Henderson urged a
four-year statute of limitations as a bar to his brother's action. He also ar-
gued that the court should not reform the deed because no evidence pointed
116. Id. at 336; see Kinkler v. Jurica, 84 Tex. 116, 19 S.W. 359, 360-61 (1892); Seale v.
Baker, 70 Tex. 283, 7 S.W. 742, 745-46 (1888); Wagner v. Morris, 658 S.W.2d 230, 233-34
(Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1983, no writ).
117. 683 S.W.2d 48, 48 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1984, no writ).
118. Id. at 51.
119. Id. at 50.
120. Id. at 51-52.
121. 688 S.W.2d 672, 673-74 (Tex. App.-Eastland 1985, no writ).
122. Id. at 675.
123. 694 S.W.2d 31, 33 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1985, writ rerd n.r.e.).
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to a mutual mistake between the parties. The court of appeals found sub-
stantial evidence that the scrivener erred when recording the deed.' 24 The
court further held that a suit for reformation of a deed is covered by a four-
year statute of limitations.1 25 The statute does not begin to run, however,
until the defect is discovered or should have been discovered if the com-
plaining party had exercised reasonable diligence.1 26
A federal court of appeals chastised the parties for unnecessarily compli-
cating a simple case in Perry v. Stewart Title Co. 127 The Perrys bought a
$70,000 house, but soon after learning that their driveway and garage en-
croached upon a utility easement, they sought to rescind the purchase. The
defendants eventually secured a release of liability for the encroachment
from the utility company for $100.00. The court held that the doctrine of
merger prevented the Perrys from relying on provisions in the earnest money
contract that allowed them to rescind the contract based upon objections to
title. 128 Additionally, the court found no basis for recision based on mutual
mistake, as the alleged mistake went to a collateral rather than a material
fact. 129 In finding the mistake went to a collateral fact, the court noted how
easily the parties in fact dealt with the encroachment problem.' 30 The mea-
sure of damages in this type of case equals the difference between the prop-
erty's value with the defect and without the defect, or alternatively, the cost
to remedy the defect.' 3' Because the homeowners limited the evidence only
to the cost of having the purchase rescinded, and produced no evidence as to
damages, they recovered nothing.' 32
In Zephyr v. Zephyr 133 a man and a woman sued each other to determine
their respective interests in a piece of property. They both claimed title to a
house under a deed naming them as co-grantees.' 34 The court held that if a
deed has more than one grantee, each having an unspecified interest, the
presumption is that each grantee possesses the right to an undivided interest
equal to those of the other grantees. 35 This presumption is rebuttable if the
plaintiff proves that all the grantees contributed unequally in consideration
for the interest.136
124. Id. at 36.
125. Id. at 31; Brown v. Harvard, 593 S.W.2d 939, 944 (Tex. 1980).
126. 694 S.W.2d at 36; see Brown v. Harvard, 593 S.W.2d 939, 944 (Tex. 1980); Sullivan v.
Barnett, 471 S.W.2d 39, 46-47 (Tex. 1971); McClung v. Lawrence, 430 S.W.2d 179, 181-82
(Tex. 1968).
127. 756 F.2d 1197, 1197-98 (5th Cir. 1985).
128. Id. at 1204-1206.
129. Id.
130. The court observed that the parties spent a half million dollars on attorney fees. Id. at
1211.
131. Id. at 1206.
132. Id.
133. 679 S.W.2d 553, 555 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1984, writ refd n.r.e.).
134. Id. The woman claimed to be the common law wife of the husband, but did not sus-
tain her burden of establishing that fact at trial. Id. at 555.
135. Id. at 556.
136. Id. at 556-57, citing Wooley v. West, 391 S.W.2d 157, 159 (Tex. Civ. App.-Tyler




In Kennesaw Life & Accident Co. v. Goss,137 the court held that one can-
not use an action for declaratory judgment to create new remedies or to
change the substantive law. A grantor who disclaims any interest in prop-
erty cannot be made a defendant under the Uniform Declaratory Judgment
Act 138 since he is not in possession within the meaning of the trespass to try
title statutes. 139
The rule against perpetuities appeared only once during the Survey pe-
riod. 140 That case, Maupin v. Dunn, 14 1 involved the court's interpretation of
an option purporting to bind the optionor and optionee and the heirs, suc-
cessors, and assigns of each.142 The optionor conveyed the property in ques-
tion to the plaintiff and plaintiff then wished to convey to one Cobb. Cobb,
however, would not accept the property without a release of the option. The
optionee refused to release. The plaintiff sued to remove a cloud on his title.
The court found that the option created a cloud upon the title and violated
the rule against perpetuities. The provision violated the rule because it gave
a right to a present interest in the property that may not arise until after the
legal time limit of the rule. 143
B. Adverse Possession
Adverse possession questions came before the higher courts only twice
during the Survey period. 144  In Bywaters v. Gannon'4 5 the appellants
purchased a lot in 1936 and constructed a home upon it in 1941. At the time
they acquired the lot, a small hedge near the private property line already
existed. Many years later, in 1955, the Bywaters purchased the adjoining
lot. When the Bywaters purchased that lot, the hedge had grown almost
seven feet wide, substantially overhanging the property line. In 1980 the
Bywaters decided to erect a fence on the property line. To build the fence
the Bywaters cleared a substantial area of hedge growth. The Gannons
brought suit for trespass claiming they held title to the area covered by the
hedge by adverse possession. 146 The trial court rendered judgment for the
Bywaters. 147 When the Gannons appealed, the Bywaters were late in filing
their brief. The court of appeals limited itself to facts contained in the brief
submitted by the Gannons 148 and reversed. The supreme court held that the
137. 694 S.W.2d 115, 116 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1985, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
138. TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 2524-1 (Vernon 1965), repealed by Act of June 16,
1985, ch. 959, § 9(1), 1985 Tex. Sess. Law Serv. 7043, 7218 (Vernon).
139. TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. § 22.001-.045 (Vernon 1984).
140. Maupin v. Dunn, 678 S.W.2d 180, 181 (Tex. App.-Waco 1984, no writ).
141. Id.
142. The conveyance read as follows: "This option shall be binding on Optionor, his heirs,
successors, and assigns, and shall inure to the benefit of Optionee his heirs, successors, and
assigns." Id. at 82-83.
143. Id.
144. Bywaters v. Gannon, 686 S.W.2d 593, 593 (Tex. 1985); Stafford v. Jackson, 687
S.W.2d 784, 784 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1985, no writ).
145. 686 S.W.2d at 594.
146. Id.
147. Id.
148. Id.; see TEX. R. Civ. P. 419 (court has discretion in hearing statement of facts).
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facts failed to support a finding of adverse possession, and reversed the court
of appeals. 149 The only evidence supporting adverse possession was that the
Gannons had always claimed the property and had maintained, clipped, pre-
served, watered, and nurtured it. The supreme court held that mere mainte-
nance of the hedge did not give adequate notice that the Gannons were in
hostile and adverse possession of the land. 150
In Stafford v. Jackson '5' the appellee sought title by right of adverse pos-
session to a tract of land that he had maintained, grazed cattle upon, and
enclosed. The record owners contended that the claimant's use of the land
failed to constitute hostile or adverse possession.' 5 2 They relied upon the
general rule that an adverse claimant can rely on grazing as evidence of ad-
verse possession only when he shows that he intentionally enclosed the land
for grazing purposes. 153 The claimant adequately proved that he used the
land for more than casual grazing and that he designedly, as opposed to
incidentally or accidentally, enclosed the land. 154 The court, convinced that
the claimant had satisfied all requirements for adversely obtaining title to a
specific tract, 155 accordingly held for the claimant. 15 6
C. Fair Market Value
The supreme court in Porras v. Craig'57 announced a significant modifica-
tion of the rules relating to the valuation of property for the purpose of dam-
age suits. The defendant mistakenly bulldozed the plaintiff's land, including
a standing fence. The difference between the land's fair market value imme-
diately before the trespass and afterwards is the usual measure of dam-
ages.158 In determining market value, a property owner is usually allowed to
testify as to the property's value.159 The owner, however, must direct his
opinion testimony to the property's fair market value only. 160 Asking the
witness if he is familiar with the market value of his property usually satisfies
149. 686 S.W.2d at 595.
150. Id. The court stated that "[s]ince mowing the grass and planting flowers does not
constitute a hostile character of possession sufficient to give notice of an exclusive adverse
possession, it stands to reason that maintaining a hedge does not either." Id.; see Miller v.
Fitzpatrick, 418 S.W.2d 884, 890 (Tex. Civ. App.-Corpus Christi 1967, writ refd n.r.e.);
Surkey v. Qua, 173 S.W.2d 230, 232 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1943, writ dism'd w.o.j.).
151. 687 S.W.2d 784, 784 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1985, no writ).
152. Id. at 787.
153. McDonnold v. Weinacht, 465 S.W.2d 136, 142 (Tex. 1971); Jamail v. Gene Naumann
Real Estate, 680 S.W.2d 621, 626 (Tex. App.-Austin 1984, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
154. 687 S.W.2d at 787-88.
155. The claimant must demonstrate that he knows exactly where the property is located
to obtain title by adverse possession. Id. at 786; see Thompson v. Texas Commerce Bank, 586
S.W.2d 138, 141 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1979, writ rerd nr.e.).
156. 687 S.W.2d at 788.
157. 675 S.W.2d 503, 503 (Tex. 1984).
158. Id. at 504; Cummer-Graham Co. v. Maddox, 155 Tex. 284, 285 S.W.2d 932, 935-36
(1956).
159. 675 S.W.2d at 504; see State v. Carpenter, 126 Tex. 604, 89 S.W.2d 194, 201 (1936);
State v. Berger, 430 S.W.2d 557, 559 (Tex. Civ. App.-Waco 1968, writ rerd n.r.e.); see also 2
R. RAY, TEXAS PRACTICE § 1422 (3d ed. 1980) (owner can testify regarding his own property
value but not someone else's).
160. 675 S.W.2d at 505.
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this requirement. The court held that the owner's testimony did not reflect
the true market value, but simply reflected an estimation of personal value of
the property.' 6' Accordingly the supreme court found no evidence of a re-
duction in fair market value of the property, and reversed the court of ap-
peals and the trial court which had awarded the owner title to the land,
$7,000 in actual damages and $50,000 in exemplary damages based on re-
duction in market value. 162 The court, faced with the ultimate disposition of
the case, held that substantial evidence showed that the plaintiff had been
injured. 16 3 The plaintiff's inability to show any reduction in market value
severely hampered any chance of recovery. One of the defendant's expert
witnesses testified that removal of the trees actually increased the market
value of the property rather than causing it to decrease.' 64 In cases where
injury to the landowner by the wrongful trespass of another is established,
however, courts may award damages for the intangible value of the property
destroyed.1 65 Accordingly, the court remanded the case to allow the plain-
tiff an opportunity to prove damages for the intangible loss of the trees.
166
D. Boundaries
1. Taxation. The Supreme Court of Texas in Oake v. Collin County167 af-
firmed a judgment of the district court favoring a property owner, reversing
the court of appeals which had found for the county taxing authority. 6
Oake sued several Collin County taxing authorities claiming that the bound-
ary line between Collin and Dallas Counties could not be discerned on his
property. He sought a declaratory judgment to that effect and an injunction
from the assessment and collection of taxes on his property until the counties
determined the boundary. 169 The trial court rendered summary judgment in
favor of Oake, but the court of appeals reversed,' 70 ruling the landowner
shoulders the burden of showing that no taxes are due and owing from
him.171 The court of appeals stated further that the burden includes locating
the true boundary line. 172 The supreme court disagreed and reversed.' 73
The court stated that a taxing entity bears the burden of showing that it is
161. Id.
162. Id. at 505-506.
163. The bulldozer razed much of plaintiffs property, including a number of large trees
and a fence. Id. at 504.
164. Id. at 506.
165. Id.; see Miloszar v. Gonzalez, 619 S.W.2d 283, 285 (Tex. Civ. App.-Corpus Christi
1981, no writ); Hamilton v. Fant, 422 S.W.2d 495, 498-99 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1967, no
writ); Moran Corp. v. Murray, 381 S.W.2d 324, 328 (Tex. Civ. App.-Texarkana 1964, no
writ); Lucas v. Morrison, 286 S.W.2d 190, 191 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1956, no writ).
166. 675 S.W.2d at 506.
167. 692 S.W.2d 454, 454 (Tex. 1985).
168. Id.
169. Id. at 454-55.
170. Piano Indep. School Dist. v. Oake, 682 S.W.2d 359, 364 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1984),
rev'd, 692 S.W.2d 454 (Tex. 1985).
171. Id. at 364.
172. Id.
173. 692 S.W.2d at 456.
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entitled to property taxes. 174 The entity may establish its entitlement if it
shows that the disputed property falls within the taxing entity's authority.175
A valid property assessment creates a burden in the entity's favor, 1 76 but in
the instant case, Oake rebutted that presumption when the County failed to
locate its boundary. 177 Because an individual has no authority to determine
boundary lines, the County bears that burden also. 178
2. Boundary disputes. In Van Zandt v. Holmes,17 9 the Waco court of ap-
peals set forth the rule for distinguishing between boundary disputes and
ordinary trespass to try title actions. If the boundary question is the reason
for the suit the action is a boundary suit though title may be disputed.' 8 0
The distinction is noteworthy since in a boundary suit the plaintiff does not
have to prove superior title whereas the opposite is true in a trespass to try
title action. 181
E. Innocent Purchaser for Value
The Forth Worth court of appeals reversed a judgment awarding title to a
claimant, an alleged innocent purchaser for value, in Raposa v. Johnson. 182
The plaintiff apparently purchased his interest in the property from the hus-
band during the pendency of a divorce proceeding. The court found that he
was therefore a subsequent purchaser. 183 No evidence showed, however,
that the purchaser paid valuable consideration for the property, and there-
fore the trial court's judgment in favor of the purchaser was in error.184
Deed recitals alone do not prove the subsequent purchaser paid valuable
consideration. 185  On a related point, the court held that the subsequent
grantee had the burden of establishing that he was an innocent purchaser. 186
F. Fixtures
In a case peculiar by its procedural irregularity, the supreme court held
that a railway tank car used to create a culvert is a fixture as a matter of
174. Id.
175. Id.; cf Nacogdoches Indep. School Dist. v. McKinney, 504 S.W.2d 832, 837 (Tex.
1974) (city must show property situs to collect taxes).
176. Cf Nolan v. San Antonio Ranch Co., 81 Tex. 315, 16 S.W. 1064, 1065 (1891) (prop-
erty is taxed in county where it is located).
177. 692 S.W.2d at 455.
178. Id.
179. 689 S.W.2d 259, 259 (Tex. App.-Waco 1985, no writ).
180. Id. at 262-63; see Plumb v. Stuessy, 617 S.W.2d 667 (Tex. 1981).
181. 689 S.W.2d at 262.
182. 693 S.W.2d 43, 44 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 1985, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
183. Id. at 47. A subsequent purchaser for value is not bound by a conveyance of the
property if he has notice. TEx. PROP. CODE ANN. § 13.001(a) (Vernon 1984). A subsequent
purchaser who takes without paying valuable consideration is bound by a conveyance regard-
less of notice. Id. § 13.001(b).
184. 693 S.W.2d at 47.
185. Id.; Davidson v. Ryle, 103 Tex. 209, 124 S.W. 616, 619-20 (1910); Fenley v. Ogletree,
277 S.W.2d 135, 144 (Tex. Civ. App.-Beaumont 1955, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
186. 693 S.W.2d at 46-47.
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law. 8 7 In an otherwise unremarkable opinion, the supreme court in Logan
v. Mullis enumerated the three factors that demonstrate a conversion of per-
sonalty to realty: "(1) the mode and sufficiency of annexation, either real or
constructive; (2) the adaption of the article to the use or purpose of the re-
alty; and (3) the intention of the party who annexed the chattel to the
realty." 1881
V. EASEMENTS
The Survey period produced a number of cases involving easements. In
Lindner v. Hill,189 the Texas Supreme Court found an implied dedication of
a road to the public. In 1889 the plaintiff's predecessors in title built a public
school upon their property, and built Lindner Road to get to the property.
The plaintiffs predecessor allowed the public to use the road at will until
1982. The court noted that dedication is a question of fact, and reiterated
the essential elements of an implied dedication from its opinion in Las Vegas
Pecan & Cattle Co. v. Zavala County, 190 also decided during the Survey pe-
riod. The elements included "(1) The acts of the landowner induced the
belief that the landowner intended to dedicate the road to public use; (2) [the
landowner] was competent to do so; (3) the public relied on these acts and
will be served by the dedication; and (4) there was an offer and acceptance of
the dedication."' 9' The court uses considerable legerdemain in satisfying
the last three elements, using much the same evidence that tended to estab-
lish the first element. The court 'noted that article 6812h, 19 2 which elimi-
nated the common law doctrine of implied dedication, applied prospectively
only. 19 3 In the Las Vegas Pecan194 case, decided six months earlier, the
court similarly allowed proof of the first element to predominate, while pay-
ing lip service to the four-element test to which the court continues ostensi-
bly to adhere.
In Sisco v. Hereford'9" Hereford sued for a declaratory judgment regard-
ing the existence of an implied easement across two tracts of lands. An ear-
lier court had established an easement in favor of the Hereford's predecessor
in title across the Varal Pasture, and the Herefords claimed they were enti-
tled to one across the La Copa Pasture as well. 196 The evidence showed that
the easement had not been used since the early 1960's and that the roadway
had deteriorated. Chevron Oil Company had put in a road across Sisco's
land that substantially followed the old easement. The Herefords argued
187. Logan v. Mullis, 686 S.W.2d 605, 609 (Tex. 1985) (Kilgarlin, J., dissenting). The
court decided the case on an issue not briefed by any party or before any court in this cause.
Id.
188. Id. at 607.
189. 691 S.W.2d 590, 591-92 (Tex. 1985).
190. 682 S.W.2d 254, 256 (Tex. 1984).
191. 682 S.W.2d at 256.
192. TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 6812h, § I (Vernon Supp. 1986).
193. Lindner, 691 S.W.2d at 592; Las Vegas Pecan, 682 S.W.2d at 256.
194. Las Vegas Pecan, 682 S.W.2d at 256-57.
195. 694 S.W.2d 3, 5 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1984, no writ).
196. Id.
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that the old easement should be relocated to the Chevron Road. Sisco ar-
gued abandonment of the old easement claiming that the Herefords had an
easement of ingress and egress on an adjacent roadway. The court found
that a change in the established easement required the consent of the par-
ties1 97 or a court of equity's finding that justice and fairness required a
change in the roadway. 198 There was no evidence that justice and fairness
required a change so none was allowed. 199
The question in McWhorter v. City of Jacksonville200 concerned whether
an easement reserved in the grantor created an easement appurtenant or an
easement in gross. An easement appurtenant would pass to subsequent
grantees, while an easement in gross is personal to the original grantee of the
easement, and is not transferable or assignable. 20' The court observed that
an easement in gross is less favored and never presumed if the court can
fairly construe it as appurtenant or attached to some other estate. 20 2 The
court defined an easement appurtenant as the existence of dominant and a
servient estate, together with a negative easement precluding the owner of
the servient estate from interfering with the right of the owner of the domi-
nant estate to use the servient estate.20 3 The court found that the reservation




In the only reported opinion treating questions applicable to condomini-
ums alone, the Dallas court of appeals reversed a summary judgment en-
tered in favor of lessees expelled from a condominium for violating bylaws
prohibiting residents under the age of sixteen from residing in the con-
domnium. 20 5 In Preston Tower Condominium Associates v. S.B. Realty,
In C. 206 a couple and their daughter, who was under sixteen, rented a condo-
minium unit from the unit's owners. The condominium bylaws prohibited
persons under the age of sixteen from permanent residency. The Association
notified the lessees of the violation, and the tenant applied to the Association
for a special exception, which the association denied.207 The Association
filed suit to enjoin the lessees from violating the bylaws. The lessees de-
fended, alleging that the prohibition deprived them of due process and equal
protection provided under the fourteenth amendment to the U.S.
197. Id. at 8.
198. Id.
199. Id.
200. 694 S.W.2d 182, 183 (Tex. App.-Tyler 1985, no writ).
201. See Drye v. Eagle Rock Ranch, Inc., 364 S.W.2d 196, 203 (Tex. 1962).
202. 694 S.W.2d at 7; Ginther v. Bammel, 336 S.W.2d 759, 763 (Tex. Civ. App.-Waco
1960, no writ).
203. 694 S.W.2d at 184.
204. Id.
205. Preston Tower Condominium Ass'n v. S.B. Realty, Inc., 685 S.W.2d 98, 100 (Tex.
App.-Dallas 1985, no writ).
206. Id.




The court of appeals canvassed foreign jurisdictions and found that other
courts have held that age restrictions on real estate ownership or occupation
are constitutional unless the restrictions are unreasonable or are arbitrarily
applied.20 9
VII. RESTRICTIONS ON THE USE OF LAND
A. Restrictive Covenants
A substantial number of cases during the Survey period involved restric-
tive covenants on the use of land. The Supreme Court of Texas dealt with
the subject in Sharpstown Civic Association, Inc. v. Pickett.210 Ronald Pick-
ett, the defendant, proposed to construct a commercial car wash on land he
owned. Pickett had purchased the land from Robert Hill who had bought
the land as two adjacent lots in 1969. Hill moved a small one-story structure
onto Lot 1 and used it as an office. This use continued until 1979 when Hill
sold both lots to Pickett. At the time of suit Pickett operated a used car lot
on Lot 1. When Pickett gave notice that he intended to use the two lots
together as a commercial car wash, the Sharpstown Civic Association and
resident landowners sought an injunction against Pickett based on certain
deed restrictions applicable to the subdivision. 21' The trial court denied in-
junctive relief based upon jury findings that Sharpstown waived its right to
enforce the deed restrictions by acquiescing in the nonresidential use of Lot
1, that Lots 1 and 2 were maintained and operated as a single parcel, and
that therefore the Association and the six landowners had waived their right
to complain of a nonresidential use of Lot 2 as well. 212 The supreme court
reversed.2 13 The residents' failure to bring an earlier suit constituted a
waiver of their right to complain about the prior use of the lots. 2 14 The
waiver, however, would carry over to the new use of the lots only if the old
use and the new use were substantially the same. 215 Here, the court found
that a car wash differed significantly from the prior use of the property.216
208. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV.
209. Preston Tower, 685 S.W.2d at 102-103; see White Egret Condominium, Inc. v. Frank-
lin, 379 So. 2d 346, 351-52 (Fla. 1979) ("The law is now clear that a restriction on individual
rights on the basis of age need not pass the 'strict scrutiny' test, and therefore age is not a
suspect classification .... We do recognize, however, that these age restrictions cannot be used
to unreasonably or arbitrarily restrict certain classes of individuals from obtaining desirable
housing. Whenever an age restriction is attacked on due process or equal protection grounds,
we find the test is: (1) whether the restriction under the particular circumstances of the case is
reasonable, and (2) whether it is discriminatory, arbitrary, or oppressive in its application.")
685 S.W.2d at 102-03; see Riley v. Stoves, 22 Ariz. App. 223, 526 P.2d 747, 751-53 (Ariz. Ct.
App. 1974).
210. 679 S.W.2d 956, 957 (Tex. 1984).
211. The deed restrictions prohibited nonresidential use of the disputed property. Id. at
957-58.
212. Id. at 957.
213. Id. at 958-59.
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The ruling prevented Pickett from using Lot 2 for any nonresidential pur-
pose and from using Lot 1 for any nonresidential purpose except for those
purposes Pickett had used the lots for prior to the suit.217
The courts of appeal also addressed "residential only" covenants. In Cole
v. Cummings21 8 the owners of a certain lot wanted to build a road through
the lot to connect their subdivision with a tract of land that they owned on
the other side. Other landowners in the subdivision sued to enforce the re-
strictive covenant that required the land "be used generally for residential
purposes only."' 219 The court found an exception to the rule that the plain-
tiffs must demonstrate irreparable harm before the court will issue injunctive
relief 220 A landowner who seeks to enjoin violation of a covenant restricting
the land to residential use need show only that the proposed activity would
be a substantial breach of the covenant. 22' The court found that the cut-
through would be for business and not residential purposes.222 Thus, the
court prohibited the cut-through.2 23
An unusual case on its facts and one not altogether clear in its reasoning is
Jordan v. Telles,2 24 in which the use restrictions were contained not in the
deed, but in the contract of sale. The contract provided that the purchaser
could not use the property for commercial purposes.225 Further, any breach
triggered a penalty equal to fifty percent of the purchase price.226 The pur-
chaser was later arrested and convicted of selling heroin. The evidence
showed that the sale occurred in the home subject to the contractual restric-
tion. The sellers demanded the 50% premium within ten days, and when
the purchaser failed to pay, filed suit for the amount.22 7 The court, however,
found that the primary purpose of the clause was not totally to prohibit
commercial activity, but rather to provide an incentive to the purchaser to
use the property for residential purposes.22 8 The court found it persuasive
that the defendants were indeed occupying the house for residential use.2 2 9
Additionally, one sales transaction does not turn a residence into a place of
commercial activity. 230
Winn v. Ridgewood Development Co.231 is the last case during the Survey
period involving a residential use restriction. The appellants, Mr. and Mrs.
Dunaway, purchased Lots 3 and 4 in the Ridgewood Addition in Fort
Worth and Mrs. Dunaway's parents bought Lots 1 and 2 adjoining the Dun-
217. Id.
218. 691 S.W.2d 11, 12 (Tex. App.-Texarkana 1985, writ ref'd n.r.e.).




223. Id. at 14-15.






230. Id. at 115.
231. 691 S.W.2d 832, 833 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 1985, no writ).
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away's lots. Mrs. Dunaway's parents, the Winns, never built a home on the
property and at all times resided out of town. In 1983, the Winns gave per-
mission to the Dunaways to build a treehouse on Lot 2 for the Dunaway
children. The developer sued seeking a permanent injunction requiring the
removal of the treehouse, and succeeded in the trial court. 232
The appellate court found that the jury's answers to special issues con-
flicted. 233 In answering Special Issue No. 2 the jury found that the treehouse
violated the provisions requiring that the lots be used for private residence
only. 234 The court found the issue broad and ambiguous and that it should
not have been submitted. 235 The jury's answer conflicted with other special
issues answered in the Dunaway's favor, in which the jury found the
treehouse both appurtenant and pertinent to the Dunaway's residence as
well as not contrasting with the surrounding lots. Applying the familiar rule
that specific findings control over ambiguous or general findings, the court
disregarded the ambiguous finding to resolve the conflict. 236 The jury re-
solved all other issues in favor of the Dunaways. The court thus held that a
treehouse is a proper use of a lot that is restricted to residential use. 237 The
restrictive term "residential purposes" means any use other than a commer-
cial one.238 Because no commercial activity took place in the treehouse, it fit
the description of residential use and was a proper use of the lot. 239
When faced with the same generic restriction against nonresidential use,
the court of appeals in Mills v. Kubena240 ruled that operation of a day-care
center violated deed restrictions forbidding use of property for other than
residential purposes.241 The defendants largely conceded that the activity
constituted prohibited activity in violation of a residential subdivision re-
striction. The more significant questions on appeal involved the defense of
substantial compliance. The nonconforming homeowners tendered an issue
to the court which placed the burden of establishing a substantial violation
upon the complaining landowners. The court, consistent with its earlier
opinion in Townplace Homeowners' Association, Inc. v. McMahon,2 42 held
that the issue was a defensive one, and that the burden rests upon the non-
conforming homeowner to persuade the jury that any violation was not
substantial.2 43
The court also affirmed the trial court's entry of judgment notwithstand-
ing the verdict on the issue of waiver. 244 The trial court instructed the jury
232. Id.
233. Id. at 834-35.
234. Id. at 833-34.
235. Id. at 834-35.
236. Id.
237. Id. at 835.
238. Id.
239. Id.; see MacDonald v. Painter, 441 S.W.2d 179, 182 (Tex. 1969).
240. 685 S.W.2d 395, 396 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1985, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
241. Id. at 397.
242. 594 S.W.2d 172, 175 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1980, writ refd n.r.e.).
243. 685 S.W.2d at 398.
244. Id. at 399. 685 S.W.2d at 399.
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that to find a waiver of a restriction prohibiting use of subdivision lots for
other than residential purposes, the person in breach of the covenant must
produce evidence showing other activities nonresidential in nature taking
place on the restricted land that would convince a reasonable man that the
covenants were waived. 245 The number, nature and severity of any prior
nonresidential use violations, and whether the restrictions had been enforced
previously should be considered in answering this issue. 246 A final point to
be considered is whether any benefit still inures from the covenant. 247 The
instruction further required evidence that the pre-existing nonresidential vio-
lation were material and adversely affected all of the lots. 248 Finally, the
court instructed the jury that the other landowners had to know of other
violations to effectuate a waiver. 249 The court found no evidence that the
landowners knew of other alleged violations in the subdivision, and therefore
affirmed the trial court in disregarding the jury's answer on the issue of
waiver. 250
A court of appeals used the fraudulent conveyance statute25' to enforce a
deed restriction against a homeowner who conveyed his property to a Cay-
man Island corporation just before trial.252 In Radney v. Clear Lake Forest
Community Association, Inc. ,253 owners of a one-story home wanted to add a
second story over the garage. They obtained a permit and began construc-
tion. A homeowners association, Clear Lake Community Forest Associa-
tion, sued to enjoin the construction. 254 Deed restrictions governing their
property restricted the height of garage structures to the height of the house
or, alternatively, to the number of stories.255 The defendant's conveyed the
property to a third party before trial, and the plaintiffs amended their suit to
include an action for fraudulent conveyance.2 56
The court found the deed restriction valid,257 and sustained the restriction
as a matter of law. The court also found no obstacle to employing an action
for fraudulent conveyance as well.2 58 The homeowners argued that an ac-
tion in fraud could not stand because the owners conveyed homestead prop-
erty which is exempt from an attack by creditors.259 Creatively, however,
the court found that article 24.02 of the Business and Commerce Code al-
lows an interested person to bring an action for fraudulent conveyance.
245. Id. at 398.
246. Id. at 398-99.




251. TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. art. 24.02 (Vernon 1968).
252. Radney v. Clear Lake Forest Community Ass'n, 681 S.W.2d 191, 193 (Tex. App.-




256. Id. at 194.
257. Id. at 195.
258. Id. at 199.
259. Id. at 197; see Chandler v. Welborn, 156 Tex. 312, 294 S.W.2d 801, 805-806 (1956).
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Since the complaining landowners were interested persons and not creditors,
the general rule that creditors may not attack a conveyance of exempt prop-
erty as fraudulent does not apply. 260 This strict reading of the fraudulent
conveyance statute is in harmony with the generally favorable and broad
interpretation given to residential subdivision restrictions.
The court took express note that the Radneys spent a substantial amount
of money on garage construction and that the court's order would require
removal of the nonconforming structure. 26' The court noted that its affirm-
ance of the trial court would cause the defendants great expense in con-
forming with the deed restriction. 262 Expense from the enforcement of deed
restriction, however, hardly necessitates waiver of enforcement. 263
Delaporte v. Preston Square, Inc. 264 noted that the failure to object to in-
substantial or trivial violations of deed restrictions does not necessarily con-
stitute waiver of adjoining landowners' rights to enforce the same restriction
against a more substantial violation. In that case the homeowners associa-
tion sued a homeowner to obtain an order to compel him to remove addi-
tions to his home which the Association claimed were in violation of his
deed restrictions.265 The dispute centered around the fact that the associa-
tion had previously approved minor additions to the defendant's home with-
out objection. The defendant claimed that the association's waiver of the
restriction in the earlier instances constituted an across the board waiver of
improvements. The court, unimpressed with the defendant's argument, held
that the previous additions were trivial in nature, and that failure to object to
those additions did not prohibit the association's future enforcement of more
substantial violation of the deed restrictions. 266
B. Zoning
The Dallas court of appeals addressed a zoning question involving com-
mercial bingo in City of Mesquite v. Coltharp.267 The city of Mesquite sought
to enjoin a fraternal lodge from running a commercial bingo business in a
part of the city zoned exclusively for retail purposes.268 The trial court held
that the lodge did not violate the zoning ordinance because commercial
bingo is not "indoor commercial recreation" which was limited by city ordi-
nance to areas zoned commercial or light commercial. 269 The court of ap-
peals disagreed. The court construed the section to mean all commercial
indoor recreation or amusement in all indoor facilities, thus including bingo
260. Id. at 197.
261. Id. at 198.
262. Id.
263. Id. at 198; Gunnels v. North Woodland Hills Community Ass'n, 563 S.W.2d 334, 338
(Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1978, no writ).
264. 680 S.W.2d 561, 563 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1984, writ ref d n.r.e.).
265. Id.
266. Id. at 565; see Fowler v. Brown, 535 S.W.2d 46, 47 (Tex. Civ. App.-Waco 1976, no
writ).
267. 685 S.W.2d 78, 80 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1984, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
268. Id.
269. Id. at 81.
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operations. 270 The court also rejected the lodge's argument that since simi-
lar organizations were allowed to conduct meetings in general retail districts,
they should be entitled to conduct bingo in general retail districts as an inci-
dental secondary activity of the lodge. The court of appeals found no evi-
dence to support the trial court's finding that commercial bingo is a
secondary or incidental activity to the general activities of the lodge. 27' The
lodge conducted commercial bingo games three nights a week for four hours,
and that indicated that the lodge operated a bingo game as its primary
activity.2 72
Legislative and judicial activity during the Survey period focused on the
issue of residential group homes for the disabled.273 In Collins v. City of El
Campo2 7 4 the plaintiff city and subdivision owners joined with nonsubdivi-
sion owners to enjoin the operation of a group home on the grounds that
such operation violated the city's zoning ordinance and also violated deed
restrictions applicable to the property. 275 The trial court found for the
plaintiff and the court of appeals reversed. 276
The Advisory Board of the El Campo Area Adult Center for the Develop-
mentally Disabled, Inc., was used as a group home for four mentally re-
tarded men. The court found that four unrelated retarded men lived in the
home along with two supervising houseparents. The four men and the house
parents functioned as a single housekeeping unit.277 The court placed great
emphasis upon the fact that the home sought to replicate a normal family
unit for the four mentally retarded men, involving preparation of meals,
household chores, shopping, and the like.278 The court of appeals looked to
the definition of family in the zoning ordinance and found that it contained
no requirement that parties occupying a dwelling and living as a single
housekeeping unit be related by blood or marriage. 279 The court also found
that while the home was called a group home, it is not the same as a board-
ing house, lodging house or hotel, all of which are prohibited by the ordi-
nance in the single-family residential district. 280 Accordingly, the four
unrelated men living together with the house parents met the zoning ordi-
nance's definition of family.28' Turning to the restrictive covenants limiting
the use of the property for residential purposes only, the court found that the
group used the home for residential purposes only and that the dwelling
conformed to the zoning ordinance in that it was a single-family dwelling. 282
270. Id.
271. Id. at 81-82.
272. Id.
273. See infra notes 399-404 and accompanying text.
274. 684 S.W.2d 756, 758 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1984, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
275. Id.
276. Id. at 762.
277. id. at 759.
278. Id. at 758.
279. Id. at 759.
280. Id. at 760 n.l.
281. Id. at 760.
282. Id. at 761. The result of the case is consistent with the new enactment discussed infra
notes 399-404 and accompanying text.
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VII. EMINENT DOMAIN, ANNEXATION AND SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY
A. Condemnation
The Supreme Court of Texas decided one case during the Survey period
involving questions of eminent domain.2 8 3 In City of Round Rock v.
Smith2 8 4 the appellee, Smith, and other subdivision homeowners sued the
city for flood damages to their homes.28 5 The city had approved the filling in
of a natural water course so that adjacent lots could be developed. During a
storm, severe flooding occurred, allegedly as a result of the filling of the
water course, causing damage and loss of life. The plaintiff's claimed that
the city negligently approved the filling of the water course and, alterna-
tively, that the city's approval constituted a governmental taking of property
without reasonable compensation.
286
The city claimed governmental immunity to the negligence claim, and the
court agreed.28 7 A city is liable for negligence only if the tort is committed
by city employees performing proprietary, not governmental, duties.2 88 Im-
munity is conferred if the tort is committed by employees performing duties
that only a city as a governmental entity can perform. 289 The approval of a
plat may only be performed by a city using its discretionary power 290 in a
governmental, not proprietary sense.29 1 Thus, the court granted immunity
from the negligence claim. 2
92
The supreme court easily disposed of the homeowners arguments that the
plat approval constituted an inverse condemnation of their property.2 93 The
Texas Constitution provides that, "[n]o person's property shall be taken,
damaged or destroyed for or applied to public use without adequate compen-
sation being made, unless by the consent of such person.' ' 294 Since the peti-
tion alleged that the developer owned the tracts at the time that the plat
approval was requested, the consent of the owner, namely, the developer,
was obtained prior to any taking. The homeowners could not, therefore,
claim an inverse condemnation as they took title through one who consented
to the governmental taking, if indeed there had been one.2 9 5
The El Paso court of appeals in City of Odessa v. Meek2 96 noted an impor-
tant limitation on evidence admissible to prove the value of land in condem-
nation proceedings. The City had filed condemnation proceedings and the
only issue was that of compensation. In determining the amount of compen-








291. Id. at 303.
292. Id.
293. Id.
294. TEX. CONST. art. I, § 17 (emphasis supplied by court).
295. 687 S.W.2d at 303.
296. 695 S.W.2d 775, 776 (Tex. App.-El Paso 1985, no writ).
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sation the trial court heard evidence pertaining to the value of land sur-
rounding the condemned property. The court of appeals reversed, holding
that because the surrounding lots were improved lots, their value could not
be used to determine the value of an unimproved condemned lot.297 The
trial court accordingly erred in permitting testimony as to sales of improved
property, at least on direct examination. 298
The court ordered a new trial in a series of prolonged condemnation cases
in United States v. 8.41 Acres of Land.299 The condemnation commission
had based a condemnation award on comparable sales of pipeline easements,
relying on the trial court's finding that the condemned tract had been effec-
tively severed from the parent tract. 300 The district court had instructed the
commissioners that comparable sales were the best method of valuation.
The condemnation commission apparently construed this to mean "compa-
rable sales of pipeline easements."' 30  Although the federal district judge
found that the government indeed condemned a pipeline easement, the court
held that the commission had erred in making an unjustified finding that the
taken tracts were severed. 30 2 The court pointed out that the problem with
the Commission's method was that the government ended up paying a frac-
tion of the price a private purchaser would have payed under similar
circumstances. 303
Accordingly, the crucial issue becomes the value of the parent tract after
the taking. 3°4 The landowners had offered comparable pipeline easement
sales only, rather than comparable values of tracts burdened with
easements. 30
5
A court of appeals in Houston affirmed a condemnation award after re-
forming it to assess costs against the condemnor. 30 6 In Anderson v. Clahon
Gas Company,30 7 the landowners appealed from a condemnation judgment
awarding them $3,211.60 as damages, and awarding the appellees an ease-
ment across their land. The landowners alleged that they did not receive
statutory notice. 308 The court found that the condemnor bears the burden of
establishing strict compliance with the notice provisions of article 3264.309
Nonetheless, the landowners' failure to object to the defects at trial consti-
297. Id. at 776.
298. Id. at 777; see State v. Chavers, 454 S.W.2d 395, 397-98 (Tex. 1970).
299. 595 F. Supp. 731, 732 (E.D. Tex. 1984).
300. Id.
301. Id.
302. Id. at 733.
303. Id. at 732.
304. Id. at 733.
305. Id.
306. Anderson v. Clason Gas Co., 677 S.W.2d 702, 703 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.]
1984, no writ).
307. Id.
308. Id. The statute requires that each party receive notice in writing. Additionally, a
return must be filed describing how the person serving notice performed his duties. Eminent
Domain Proceedings-Award Decisions Act, ch. 105, § 1, 1961 Tex. Gen. Laws 203, 203-204,
repealed by Act of June 19, 1983, ch. 576, § 6, 1983 Tex. Gen. Laws 3729, 3729.
309. Id. at 704.
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tuted a waiver of notice,310 and the court held for the appellees. 31,
The court disposed of appellant's claim that the gas company arbitrarily
exercised eminent domain by referring to article 1436 of the Texas Statutes.
That provision requires no showing of necessity when exercising eminent
domain. 31 2 The court held that an acquisition of a right-of-way for future
use is not an arbitrary or capricious action.31 3
The landowners also complained that the gas company failed to negotiate
in good faith. 314 The court held that a condemnor is not required to negoti-
ate if such attempts appear futile. 315 The evidence was sufficiently estab-
lished that such was the case. As a final point, the court reformed the
judgment to eliminate the award of costs against the landowner. 316 Under
article 3267, the court may not authorize costs against the landowner if the
amount of damages the commissioners and the trial court awarded is more
than the condemnor offered before the suit.317
In Matador Pipelines of Texas, Inc. v. Martin318 another court rejected
what it termed "a rule of hyper-technicality" 31 9 in the law of eminent do-
main. The trial court granted a motion for directed verdict against the con-
demnation plaintiff on the ground that notice to the landowner was defective
since the server failed to return service. 320 The landowner, however, admit-
ted that he had received a copy of the notice. The court, unpersuaded by
other technical objections, which it viewed as part and parcel of an attempt
to read the notice requirements of condemnation proceedings too literally
and strictly,321 reversed. 322
B. Annexation
In Larkins v. City of Denison323 landowners sued the city to declare an
ordinance and the city's proposed annexation under authority of the ordi-
nance void. The landowners claimed that the city lacked sufficient resources
to provide essential services to the landowners. 324 The court of appeals af-
firmed the trial court's entry of summary judgment against the landown-
ers. 325 The power to lay municipal boundaries is reserved, with
310. Id. at 704, citing PGP Gas Prods. v. Fariss, 620 S.W.2d 559, 560 (Tex. 1981).
311. 677 S.W.2d at 706.
312. Id. at 704-705; TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 1436 (Vernon 1980).
313. Id. at 705.
314. Id.
315. Id. at 706, citing Houston North Shore Ry. Co. v. Tyrell, 128 Tex. 248, 98 S.W.2d
786, 795 (1936).
316. 677 S.W.2d at 706.
317. See TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. § 21.047 (Vernon 1984) (formerly at TEX. REV. Civ.
STAT. ANN. art. 3267 (Vernon 1968), repealed by Act of June 13, 1983, ch. 105, § 6, 1983 Tex.
Gen. Laws 3729, 3729).
318. 684 S.W.2d 165, 166 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1984, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
319. Id. at 168.
320. Id. at 166-67; see supra note 308 for notice requirements.
321. Id. at 168.
322. Id.
323. 683 S.W.2d 754, 755 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1984, no writ).
324. Id.; see TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 970a (Vernon 1963 & Pam. Supp. 1986).
325. 683 S.W.2d at 757.
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limitations, 326 in the political entity, not the judiciary.3 27 The limitations
apply to the location of the proposed annexation and not to the purposes of
the annexation. 328 Thus an annexation ordinance's validity may not be chal-
lenged in the judiciary if improper purpose is the ground for the charge. 329
The court also held that section 10(F) of article 970a provides the exclusive
remedy for the failure of a municipality to meet the service requirements of
that article. 330 That section provides that a majority of the qualified voters
of the annexed area must file for a petition of disannexation. 331 Where a
statute provides a particular remedy, the court should be wary of reading
into it other remedies which negate the profections for competing interests
which the legislature considered when shaping the remedies. 332
C. Sovereign Immunity
In Cornelius v. Armstrong333 the court of appeals held that a plaintiff's
trespass to try title suit against the State should allege sufficient jurisdictional
facts evidencing a showing that the State consents to the suit.334 The court
also held that the plaintiff must produce legislative authority authorizing the
suit. 335 On the substantive merits of the trespass to try title action, the court
affirmed the take nothing judgment rendered against the plaintiff in his suit
against the individual nongovernmental defendants. 336 The court stated that
a plaintiff may recover in a trespass to try title suit if he: "(1) proves a
regular chain of conveyances from the sovereign, (2) proves a superior title
out of a common source of title or (3) proves title under an appropriate
statute or (4) proves prior possession which has not been abandoned." 337
Apparently, the Land Commissioner of Texas in 1938 had determined
that the acres the plaintiff claimed were vacant and not previously titled by
the State. 338 The plaintiff attempted to prove he had succeeded to title in the
land through a chain of transfers beginning with the State of Texas. The
plaintiff failed in all respects to prove title.339 In fact, the plaintiff never
proved that the State ever transferred the title to the property.340
IX. RIVERS AND STREAMS
In the only case decided during the survey period involving waters and
326. See TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 970a, § 7 (Vernon Pam. Supp. 1986).
327. 683 S.W.2d at 756.
328. Id.
329. Id.
330. Id.; see TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 970a, § 10(0 (Vernon Pam. Supp. 1986).
331. Id. § 10(B)(2)(F).
332. Id. at 757.
333. 695 S.W.2d 48, 49 (Tex. App.-Tyler 1985, no writ).
334. Id. at 49-50.
335. Id. at 50.
336. Id. at 51.
337. Id. at 50.
338. Id.
339. Id.
340. Id. at 50-51.
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water courses, the court of appeals dealt with the question of ownership of
the river bed of a new man-made water course on the Colorado River.3 4'
In Selkirk Island Corp. v. Standley both parties claimed title to a portion
of a river bed pursuant to a warranty deed executed by a common source of
title.342 The appellant argued that the appellee's conveyance limited the title
to only the riverbank, and that he held true title to the disputed riverbed.
The court disagreed with the appellant and held that a conveyance of prop-
erty adjacent to a stream, navigable or not, also constitutes a conveyance of
one-half of the adjacent riverbed, 34 3 subject to rights the public may have to
the river or riverbed. 344 While the Colorado River is navigable and a "pub-
lic river," it flowed across a portion of the property in question only by vir-
tue of an easement created by the common ancestor in title to Magorda
County. 345 Thus, this particular river bed remained privately owned.
X. FORECLOSURE AND EXECUTION
The Dallas court of appeals, in Group Purchase, Inc. v. Lance Investments
Co. ,346 reversed a summary judgment in favor of a former owner of residen-
tial property who brought suit to set aside an execution sale and to cancel a
sheriff's deed based upon gross inadequacy of price at the sheriff's sale. The
trial court had granted summary judgment for the corporate owner of the
property sold at a sheriff's sale based solely upon an affidavit of a broker.347
The court noted that summary judgment may properly be based on the un-
controverted testimonial evidence of expert witnesses only where the expert
witnesses testify "as to subject matter concerning which the trier of fact
must be guided solely by the opinion testimony of experts. '348 Land value
does not fit that description. Thus, the trial court should not have accepted
the testimony.3 49
Mercer v. Daoran Corp. 350 is a significant opinion involving the effect of
renewal and extension agreements on lien priority and in which the court
detailed the relationship between articles 5520 and 5522 of the Civil Statutes.
The question concerned the ability of a junior lien holder to gain priority if a
senior lien holder fails properly to renew and extend the senior lien. 35' In
1974 Charles and Pauline Ducroz, son and mother, signed a promissory note
and deed of trust naming the bank as beneficiary. In February, 1975 Jon
341. Selkirk Island Corp. v. Standley, 683 S.W.2d 793, 794 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi
1984, writ refd n.r.e.).
342. Id.
343. Id. at 796.
344. Id.
345. Id.; see Coastal Indus. Water Auth. v. York, 532 S.W.2d 949, 954 (Tex. 1976) (title is
not destroyed because land is submerged).
346. 685 S.W.2d 729, 730 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1985, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
347. Id.
348. Id. at 731; see TEX. R. Civ. P. 166-A(c).
349. 685 S.W.2d at 731.
350. 676 S.W.2d 580, 581-82 (Tex. 1984); see TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. arts. 5520, 5522
(Vernon 1958), repealed by Acts of 1985, ch. 959, § 9, 1985 Tex. Gen. Laws 7218, 7218 (now
found in TEx. Civ. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 16.035-.037 (Vernon Pam. 1986).
351. 676 S.W.2d at 581.
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Mercer obtained and abstracted a judgment against Charles Ducroz. Later
in the same year, the Ducrozes executed a second promissory note and deed
of trust to the bank. The instruments failed to recite whether they were "in
renewal and extension" of the original 1974 debt. 35 2 Mrs. Ducroz acquired
the half interest belonging to her son in 1976. In that year and in 1977 and
1978 she executed three additional deeds of trusts that expressly recited that
they were "in renewal and extension" of the earlier obligation and secur-
ity. 353 In September, 1979, the creditor, Mercer, foreclosed upon the prop-
erty, bought it at the sheriff's sale, and recorded the sheriff's deed. Mrs.
Ducroz defaulted on the 1978 note in 1980. The bank foreclosed, bought the
property at the sale and recorded the Trustee's deed. The bank later con-
veyed its interest in the property to Daoran Corporation.
In the petition Mercer claimed title to one-half of the property through
the 1975 judgment that he properly abstracted and foreclosed upon. 354
Daoran claimed title pursuant to the bank's deed of trust lien which Daoran
argued originated prior to Mercer's judgment lien.355 Mercer countered that
the 1974 deed of trust lien was the only lien prior to his judgment lien. Mer-
cer also contended that the 1974 deed of trust had not been renewed and
extended.356 Thus, a four year statute of limitations barred any claim under
the 1974 deed of trust.357  The court, interpreting article 5522,3 58 held that
the 1975 deed of trust did not qualify as an article 5522 contract of extension
because it did not mention the 1974 note and lien nor state that it purported
to renew or extend the lien. 359 Daoran then argued that the protection of
articles 5520 and 5522 did not apply to junior lienholders who acquire inter-
ests in property upon which a valid prior lien of record exists. 360 The
supreme court, following an earlier opinion agreed. 361 The court found that
Mercer, having acquired his lien during the time the bank had a valid lien,







358. Article 5522 governs the renewal and extension of contracts. A landowner and a note
holder may agree to review and extend a debt and lien only if the rights of other lienholders do
not suffer prejudice after the liens become time-banned. TEX. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 5522
(Vernon 1958) (repealed 1985) (now found in TEX. CIv. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 15.036-
.037 (Vernon Pam. 1986).
359. 676 S.W.2d at 582.
360. Id.
361. In Novosad v. Svrcek, 129 Tex. 34, 102 S.W.2d 393, 396 (1937) the court stated that:
[tihe primary objects of this article [article 5223] appear to be: (1) To protect a
purchaser or lien holder for value and without notice from a prior lien upon
land, when it appears from the record that such note or notes for which a prior
lien was given are barred by limitations; and (2) not to protect the lien holder
who acquires a lien with full knowledge of a valid existing prior lien, then in full
force, from a renewal and extension of such prior lien by the owner of the land,
although such renewal and extension may be executed either before or after such
prior lien appears to be barred by limitation.
362. 676 S.W.2d at 682.
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The court further found that Mercer did not qualify as a "bona fide third
person" 363 within the meaning of article 5520 and, accordingly, the statutory
presumption that a debt is paid after the four-year limitations period did not
apply to Mercer.364 As a result, neither article 5520 nor article 5522 pro-
tected Mercer, and any renewal and extension agreement between the
Ducrozes and the bank would prevent him from recovery.365
The final step in the Court's analysis was to determine whether any valid
renewal and extension agreement ever existed. The bank relied upon the
affidavit of its president conclusively stating that the indebtedness was "re-
newed and extended. ' 366 The court held that a legal conclusion is insuffi-
cient to raise an issue of fact in response to a motion for summary judgment,
and accordingly could not establish the existence of a fact in support of a
motion for summary judgment. 367 The bank attached a copy of a renewal
note to the bank president's affidavit, but that note had not been executed.
The bank neither produced the original note nor explained its absence.
Thus, the best evidence rule kept the original note's contents in issue. 36 8 The
trial court erred in granting the summary judgment based upon the renewal
copy.369
Two cases involved homestead issues in a foreclosure setting. In Johnson
v. First Southern Properties, Inc. ,370 the court decided whether an assessment
lien pursuant to a condominium declaration existed prior to the condomin-
ium homeowner's homestead rights. The appellant purchased an apartment
subject to a lien held by the homeowner's council for unpaid assessments.
The council had authority to enforce the lien through foreclosure. 37 1 The
appellant challenged the exercise of the council's authority, claiming home-
stead protection.3 72 The appellant construed the homestead provisions to
prevent any forced sale of a homestead if the lien does not meet any of the
exceptions listed to the prohibition of forced sales. 373 The court, however,
subordinated the homstead claim to the lien. 374 The lien constituted a pre-
existing debt which overcomes homstead rights, found the court.375 The
court further found that the condominium act provision for preferential pay-
ment on resale 376 did not create the exclusive means of recovery of assess-
363. A "bona fide third person" is someone who acquires an interest in property when the
lien debt is over four years past due and no renewal or extension exists. TEX. REV. CIv. STAT.
ANN. art. 5520 (Vernon 1958) (repealed 1985) (now found in TEX. CIv. PRAC. & REM. CODE
ANN. §§ 15.035-.037 (Vernon Pam. 1986).
364. 676 S.W.2d at 682.
365. Id.
366. Id. at 583.
367. Id.
368. Id. at 584.
369. Id.
370. 687 S.W.2d 399, 401 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1985, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
371. See Act of June 21, 1975, ch. 723, § 1, 1975 Tex. Gen. Laws 2354, 2354, repealed by
Act of June 19, 1983, ch. 576, § 6, 1983 Tex. Gen. Laws 3729, 3729.
372. See TEX. CONST. art. XVI, § 50.
373. Id.; see TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. § 42.002 (Vernon 1984).
374. 687 S.W.2d at 401.
375. 687 S.W.2d at 401-402.
376. TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. § 81.208 (Vernon 1984).
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ments, and that the co-owners were free to establish other remedies among
themselves.
377
In Villarreal v. Laredo National Bank378 a wife sued to enjoin a foreclo-
sure sale arising from a home improvement note that she and her ex-hus-
band executed. The husband had obtained title to the former homestead
under a divorce decree entered well after the note upon which the foreclo-
sure was sought. Pursuant to the express recital of the decree the wife had
retained the right to occupy the premises until the youngest child had
reached the age of eighteen. 379 The San Antonio court held that a wife can
have a homestead claim in property in which she has no fee ownership inter-
est. 380 It also ruled that the husband could not renew a debt on that home-
stead property, even though a divorce had occurred. 381 Apparently, after
the divorce the husband had executed a real estate lien note payable to the
bank together with a deed of trust containing language of "renewal and ex-
tension. '382 The bank foreclosed on the deed of trust. The court deter-
mined that placing title in the husband alone following divorce did not
dispense with the requisite that the wife must participate in a renewal and
extension of a debt against an existing homestead. 383 Accordingly, the hus-
band could not renew and extend the lien upon the homestead without the
wife's consent. 384
XI. LEGISLATION
The following is a brief review of the major enactments of the 69th Legis-
lature concerning topics within the scope of this Article. The reader should
consult the session laws for the complete texts.
House Bill 351385 amended article 6626 of the Civil Statutes. Plans to
revise subdivision plats now require that notice must be published three
times within a period beginning on the seventh day before the date of the
meeting. 386
In a significant step, the Legislature enacted the Texas Timeshare Act.387
Section 3(a)(2)-(4) requires a detailed declaration of each unit, including size
and an interior floor plan, a description of amenities, and a statement of the
fractional part which each unit bears to the whole.388 A timeshare unit is
now an interest in land for purposes of the Real Estate License Act,3 89 arti-
377. 687 S.W.2d at 402.
378. 677 S.W.2d 600, 603 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1984, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
379. Id. at 604.
380. Id. at 606-607.
381. Id. at 607.
382. Id. at 604.
383. Id. at 607.
384. Id.
385. Tex. H.B. 351, 69th Leg. (1985).
386. TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 6626c (Vernon Supp. 1986).
387. Tex. S.B. 92, 69th Leg. (1985) (current version at TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art.
6573c (Vernon Supp. 1986)).
388. TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 6573c, § 3(a)(2)-(4) (Vernon Supp. 1986).
389. TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 6573a (Vernon Supp. 1986).
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cle 6573a. Importantly, it requires registration of the timeshare property
with the Texas Real Estate Commission. 390 Section 7 of the Act requires
that a disclosure statement be prepared, filed and distributed for any sales
promotion involving timeshares. 39' This section contemplates an elaborate
document.
Section 8 gives the purchaser four days to cancel a contract to purchase a
timeshare interest if he did not visit the property and view a substantially
complete accommodation. 392 Section 10 mandates and regulates escrow ac-
counts for the protection of purchasers' deposit. 393 Section 11 makes six
specific timeshare practices violations of the Texas Deceptive Trade Prac-
tices Act.394 Section 12 requires the developer to maintain property to and
liability insurance on the timeshare property.3 95
Other important developments also took place. Senate Bill 641396 permits
cities, towns and villages to use or permit the use of rights-of-way of public
streets for trees and decorative landscaping, sidewalk cafes, subdivision en-
trances, certain architectural details of historic buildings, and benches and
water fountains incidental to vehicular or pedestrian traffic. House Bill
1218 397 extensively revises the Manufactured Housing Standard Act, creat-
ing a regulatory framework for modular housing and commercial buildings.
Senate Bill 906 made extensive revisions to the escheat provisions of the
Texas Property Code. 398
Senate Bill 940399 marks an important step. The Community House for
the Disabled Persons Location Act 4°° makes a "family home" a permitted
use in all residential zones or districts in the State. A "family home" quali-
fies if it consists of not more than six physically or mentally impaired per-
sons regardless of legal relationship to one another, and two supervisory
persons, but restricts any such home from being within one-half mile from a
preexisting family home. Deed restrictions to the contrary created after Sep-
tember 1, 1985 are void.
The Legislature amended the Texas Real Estate License Act 40' to provide
for more comprehensive regulation of real estate inspectors employed by
buyers and sellers of real property.40 2 It requires licensing after examina-
tion,40 3 and provides for a real estate inspection recovery fund 404 in the
390. TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 66573c, § 6(a) (Vernon Supp. 1986).
391. Id. § 7.
392. Id. § 8.
393. Id. § 10.
394. Id. § 11.
395. Id. § 12.
396. Tex. S.B. 641, 69th Leg. (1985).
397. Tex. H.B. 1218, 69th Leg. (1985).
398. Tex. S.B. 906, 69th Leg. (1985); see TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. §§ 71.001-.002, 71.007,
71.101, 71.102, 71.107 (Vernon Supp. 1986).
399. Tex. S.B. 940, 69th Leg. (1985).
400. TEX.-REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 101 in (Vernon Pam. Supp. 1986).
401. TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 6573a (Vernon Supp. 1986).
402. See Tex. H.B. 2182, 69th Leg. (1985).
403. Id. § 18c(j).
404. Id. § 18c(e)(i).
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event an aggrieved party is unable to collect on a judgment against an in-
spector for violations of the Act.
The Texas Property Code was amended by H.B. No. 2256 to add a Title
II dealing with restrictive covenants applicable to subdivisions. It creates a
nonjudicial petition system through which landowners may create, extend,
add to, or modify restrictions on the use of property. Non-consenting land-
owners and lenders may exclude themselves from the operation of the new
restrictions.40 5
405. Tex. H.B. 2256, 69th Leg. (1985).
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